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The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and
Sections I and 6( I) of the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms
J.-G. CASTEL*
SHARON A. WILLIAMS*

INTRODUCTION

T

ARTICLE IS devoted to the question of whether the extradition from Canada of a fugitive Canadian citizen charged with
having committed an act that constitutes a criminal offence for
which he or she may be prosecuted both in Canada and in the
requesting state is a violation of his or her right as a citizen of Canada
to remain in Canada, that is guaranteed by section 6( I ) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'
In analysing this question we shall ( i ) give a brief history of and
rationale for extradition, with emphasis on the variations in application by states of extradition of citizens; (2) assess whether section
6 ( i ) of the Charter of Rights ipso facto does in fact contain a right
that extradition infringes; (3) enquire whether if indeed extradition
infringes prima facie the section 6 ( i ) right to remain in Canada of
a Canadian citizen, it is a reasonable limit, prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, even
where he or she could be prosecuted in Canada on the same facts;
(4) review the role of the Minister of Justice in extradition matters;
(5) look at the comparative interests of states that have concurrent
jurisdiction over the criminal offence and their impact on prosecutorial discretion in the requested state; and (6) discuss interpretation
of extradition treaties.

HIS

* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.

Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B, Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
C. Ii.
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EXTRADITION
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND RATIONALE

Extradition may be defined as the giving up of a person by a state
in whose territory he or she is present, at the request of another state
in whose jurisdiction that person is accused of having committed or
has been convicted of a crime.
The origins of extradition can be traced back to ancient civilizations2 and its modern developments traced to the eighteenth century.'
However, from a contemporary perspective it is clear that in the last
forty years or so the international community has witnessed increased
inter-state co-operation in the suppression of crime. New phenomena
exclusive to this period have produced and increased new opportunities for criminal activities. Developments in the fields of transportation, communications, and computer technology, as well as
social and economic changes, have resulted in mass movements of
people and more particularly criminals who are more organized,
more mobile and their activities hence more complex. During this
time-frame criminal activities have crossed territorial boundaries and
have become international or transnational.4 These types of criminal
activities, whose perpetrators may be from several states, cannot be
adequately dealt with unless, first, states are prepared to use wide,
even flexible, bases of jurisdiction over the offence. Reliance upon
the territorial principle alone will not be sufficient. It reflects the
concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty of the independent nation
state and does not meet the present concerns of the interdependence
of the international community in repressing international and transnational crime. Second, states agree through bilateral and multilateral treaties to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere, aut judicare),
2

A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 9 (1954).

3 G. V. La Forest, Extradition to and from Canada i (2nd ed., 1977); I. A.

Shearer, Extradition in InternationalLaw 5 (1971 ) ; S. A. Williams and J.-G.
Castel, Canadian Criminal Law: International and Transnational Aspects
348 (1981).
4 International crimes, stricto sensu, are offences that have been proscribed by

the international community through multilateral treaties or customary international law. International crimes include, for example, hijacking and other
terrorist acts such as hostage-taking and attacks against internationally protected persons, trafficking in narcotics, piracy, and war crimes. Transnational
crimes (although often incorrectly labelled "international") are ordinary common law crimes and the only international law connotation is that they contain one or more foreign elements.
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and third, states co-operate in extending mutual assistance to one
another in criminal matters.
The adoption of multilateral treaties dealing with international
criminal activities containing aut dedere, aut judicare provisions,'
the entry into force of new bilateral extradition treaties, and the
ratification of mutual co-operation treaties in criminal matters' indicate that states have the will to take definite steps to deter and if that
does not occur to prosecute and punish those who commit acts recognized as criminal by the states involved. This is necessary to protect
the health and welfare of peoples of all states by combatting, through
such international co-operation, serious international and transnational crimes.
CANADA

In Canada extradition is a creature of statute, the Extradition
Act.7 Canada does not extradite if there is not an extradition treaty
in force with the requesting foreign state, except in two situations:
first, where there is an agreement with a foreign state pursuant to
Part II of the Extradition Act.8 This was done for the first time in
1974 with the Federal Republic of West Germany' and subsequently
with Brazil in 1979 and with India in 1985. It should be noted that
such agreements only apply to offences committed after the entry
into force of the agreement, whereas extradition treaties, unless there
is express provision to the contrary," apply to crimes committed
both before and after. Second, Canada does not require an extradition treaty to extradite where the surrender of fugitives from justice
from one part of the Commonwealth to another is concerned. It is
known as "rendition" and is provided for in Canada by the Fugitive
5 See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, i972 Can. T.S. No. 23.

6 See, for example, Canada-United States Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters (1985), 24 Int'l Leg. Mat. io92, not yet in force.
TR.S.C. 1970, c. E-2 i.
8

Ibid.

9 On July i1, 1977, Canada signed an extradition treaty with the Federal
Republic of West Germany, in force as of September 3o, 1979. See 1979
Can. T.S. No. i8. Canada signed an extradition treaty with India in February
1987.
10 See, for example, the extradition treaty between Canada and Israel,

Can. T.S. No. 25.
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Offenders Act." This statute limits Canada's rendition process to
those Commonwealth countries that recognize the Queen as head of
state. This would appear to limit rendition from Canada to Australia,
Bahamas, Barbados, Fiji (questionable since the 1987 coup), Jamaica, Mauritius, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and the United
Kingdom.
EXTRADITION OF CITIZENS: VARIATIONS IN APPLICATION

A state's entering into an extradition treaty signifies an acceptance
during the negotiation process of an equivalence, more or less, of
conceptions of the fundamentals of criminal justice. Is it in keeping
with this acceptance to refuse to extradite nationals or citizens, on
the one hand, but to surrender permanent residents and other aliens,
on the other? If it is conceived that justice in the foreign state is
equivalent to that at home, then extradition of all offenders should
take place.
The Practiceof Common Law States
As far back as 1877, Lord Cockburn declared in R. v. Wilson"
that the nationality exception to extradition was a "blot on the law."
In 1878 Lord Cockburn chaired a Royal Commission to inquire into
all aspects of extradition law. The traditional arguments for nonextradition of nationals or citizens were as follows: (i) the fugitive
ought not to be withdrawn from his natural judges; (2) the state
owes to its subjects the protection of its laws; (3) it is impossible to
have complete confidence in the justice meted out by a foreign state,
especially with regard to a foreigner; and (4) it is disadvantageous
to be tried in a foreign language, separated from friends, resources,
and character witnesses. The Royal Commission, as far back as 1878,
found that Great Britain should not adopt such an approach."
Clearly, if common law countries such as Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and other Commonwealth
countries refused to extradite their citizens, the situation would result
that the offenders would be able to avoid prosecution, as these states
11 R.S.C. 1970, c. F- 3 2.
12

(1877), 3 Q.B.D. 42, at 44.

13 Report of the Royal Commission on Extradition, Parliamentary Papers, 1878,
vol. 24, Reports, 907-17.
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use for the most part 4 the territorial principle as the primary basis
for jurisdiction over offences.
The British approach is that where an extradition treaty contains
no reference to nationality or citizenship, it applies to all persons.
British courts have not accepted the view that non-extradition of
nationals or citizens is a rule of customary international law that
should be implied in extradition treaties. 5
In Canada, likewise, the pre-Charter of Rights case law dealing
with the question has held clearly that unless there is a provision
refusing extradition for nationals in the extradition treaty the fugitive cannot resist extradition on this basis." However, where the
treaty specifically provides for this exemption, the extradition judge
must discharge the fugitive once his or her citizenship has been
established.'
Most of Canada's treaties that mention the matter provide that
the states parties are not obliged to extradite their nationals or citizens. This gives the requested state a discretion whether to agree to
surrender or not, even if a prima facie case is made by the requesting
state and all other procedural requirements are met. In the English
case of Re Galwey"8 it was held that this is a matter for the Secretary
of State to decide and that the extradition judge must commit for
surrender if all the requirements are met.
This is clearly a policy matter and a political decision that is within
the discretion of the executive, namely the Minister of Justice, as is
the case with the political offence exception to extradition 9 and a
refusal to extradite where the death sentence may be imposed.' As
Dr., as he then was, La Forest notes: "The decision to surrender in
14

The nationality principle, as a basis of jurisdiction, is only used for a few
serious crimes.

15 Shearer, op. cit. supra note 3, at io. See Halsbury's Laws of England ( 4 th
ed., 1977), vol. 18, Extradition and Fugitive Offenders, at 84, para. 21 1.
16 Re Burley (1865), 1 C.L.J. 34; Re Low (1932), 41 O.W.N. 468 (C.A.). As
La Forest, op. cit. supra note 3, at 78, n. 66, indicates, the earlier treaties
spoke of "British Subjects." This includes Canadian citizens.
17 R. v. Wilson (1877), 3 Q.B.D. 42; Re Guerin (1889), 6o L.T.R. 538.
is [1896] 1 Q.B. 23o, at 236. See also R. v. Macdonald, Ex p. Strutt (191o), II
Q.L.T. 85, at 9o and Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca (1983),
145 D.L.R. (3d) 638, at 655; [1 9 8 3 ] 4 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at 401, aff'ing (1983)
38 O.R. (2d) 705, (983) 7o C.C.C. (2d) 416 (H.C.).
19 See s. 22 of the Extradition Act.
20 See, e.g., Art. 6 of the Extradition Treaty with the United States, 1976 Can.
T.S. No. 3.
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such a case is a political one and the Courts should commit the21fugitive to prison pending the decision of the political authorities."
The Practice of Civil Law States
States whose legal systems owe their origins to the Roman law
tradition have taken an uncompromising attitude towards the extradition of their nationals or citizens. Refusal to extradite is based on
the ground mentioned by the Royal Commission in 1878,22 that is
on the perceived duty that these states feel they must demonstrate
towards their nationals, to protect them from the vagaries of alien
justice systems. It is a form of legal xenophobia no longer warranted
today, especially since treaties provide for adequate safeguards. Refusal to extradite is usually justified by possible domestic prosecution
based on the nationality principle of jurisdiction over the offence.
This attitude of lack of faith and actual distrust is not in keeping
with the spirit behind extradition treaties. As was aptly stated:
The argument advanced ... for non-extradition of nationals proves too

much. If justice as administered in other States is not to be trusted, then
there should be no extradition at all. If a State owes to its nationals a
duty to apply its own laws to them as to acts, wherever committed by
them, then it should demand extradition of nationals who have been
taken into custody there. In fact, in the latter situation, the State of
allegiance contents itself with watching to see that its nationals obtain
justice.
The same protection of nationals should suffice after extradi23
tion.

The nationality exception has also been criticized actively by civilian
writers.24 The only rationale given is that the detrimental impact is
tempered by the substitution of prosecution for extradition. In some
ways it is an application of the aut dedere, aut judicare rule.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that even where the requested state
has jurisdiction to prosecute based on the nationality of the fugitive,
it places the fugitive in a privileged position, as the state of nationality has no real interest in prosecuting him or her for an offence in
a foreign state, perhaps against foreign persons, with remote sources
3, at 78.

21

Op. cit. supra note

22

Supra note 13.

23

Comment on Harvard Draft Extradition Convention (1935),

29 Am. J.

Int'l L. Supp. 128.
24

See J. C. Lomnbois, Droit pdnal international458 (197I ). See also H. Schultz,
"The Principles of the Traditional Law of Extradition," in Legal Aspects of
Extradition among European States, Council of Europe 19-20 (1970).
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of evidence and general lack of contact with the scene of the crime.
The practical objections that can be raised constitute a grave handicap to both prosecution and defence counsel. 5 Shearer suggests that:
"[W]here the result is the acquittal of the accused - the chances of
which are substantially increased by trial under such conditions the charge can all too easily be made by the authorities of the locus
delicti that the prosecuting State performed its duty without effort
or enthusiasm."26
SECTION 6 ( I ) OF THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
EXTRADITION FROM CANADA

In the past, Canada has extradited Canadian citizens where either
the extradition treaty was silent on the matter of nationality or where
a discretion existed whether or not to extradite nationals and it was
exercised in favour of extradition by the Minister of Justice. The
pertinent issue is therefore whether the Charter of Rights has since
1982 altered this position.
Section 6 ( I) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
provides that: "Every citizen of Canada has a right to enter, remain
in and leave Canada." The essential question that must be addressed
is what does the right to remain in Canada mean? What is the content of that right? Is the right not to be extradited the right being
protected? It is only if the Extradition Act is inconsistent with the
meaning of section 6 ( I ) and in contravention of the right to remain
in Canada that it is necessary to look at section I of the Charter. As
Dickson, C.J.C. stated in Regina v. Oakes: "To my mind, it is highly
desirable to keep ss. i and Ii (h) [the right to be presumed innocent
being the right under consideration in that case] analytically distinct.
Separating the analysis into two components is consistent with the
approach this Court has taken to the Charter to date."27 He held
further that: "Accordingly, any s. I enquiry must be premised on an
understanding that the impugned limit violates constitutional rights
and freedoms - rights and freedoms that are part of the supreme
law of Canada." 28 As Madame Justice Wilson stated in Operation
Dismantle v. The Queen: "The rights under the Charter not being
absolute, their content or scope must be discerned quite apart from
25

Shearer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 122.

20

Ibid.

27 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 1o3; (1986), 24 C.C.C. ( 3 d)
28

( 1 9 86), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 345.

321, at 344.
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any limitation sought to be imposed upon them by the government
under s. i.
It is submitted that the courts in Re FederalRepublic of Germany
and Rauca0 who initially tackled the question of section 6 ( i) and
extradition erred in holding that extradition prima facie violates the
right to remain in Canada. As we shall demonstrate, it can be argued
that the right to remain does not include the right not to be extradited.
It is our view that the Ontario courts in Rauca did not sufficiently
analyse this matter but rather went straightaway to the section i
limitation rationale. Extradition was found to be a reasonable limitation. It was clear in our view that it would be because prosecution of
an alleged Nazi war criminal for crimes committed in Lithuania
during the Second World War was not possible in Canada at that
time." Thus it is distinguishable on its facts from the subject of this
article. Later courts 2 have not challenged this analysis, but have
unquestioningly adopted the section i approach. It is only in the
recent case of Swystun v. U.S.A."" that Hannsen J. undertook a more
detailed analysis of this matter and held that the language of section
6 ( i ) was broad enough in his view to affect extradition. We respectfully disagree for the reasons that follow.
The travaux priparatoiresof the Charter indicate that the intent
of the drafters of section 6 ( i ) was to provide for the right of citizens
to enter and leave Canada and be protected from expulsion. Section
6 ( r ) of the Charter would appear to seek to prevent, in this context,
a Canadian government from either enacting specific legislation
expelling certain groups of Canadian citizens or from amending the
Immigration Act and providing for deportation of Canadian citizens
who have obtained that citizenship legitimately. It does not seek to
prevent in accordance with our long-standing practice and in fulfilment of our treaty obligations the extradition of Canadian citizens
who are fugitives from criminal justice.
29

[1986] 1 S.C.R.

44

1; (1986), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481, at 517.

20 Supra note 18.
31

See the Desch~nes Report on War Criminals in Canada (1986). Note the
legislation adopted by Parliament in September 1987, to provide for such
prosecutions to take place: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, etc., S.C.
1987, c. 37.

32 See, e.g., Re Decter and United States of America (1983), 148 D.L.R. (3d)
496 (S.C.N.S.); Re Voss and the Queen (1984), 12 C.C.C. ( 3 d) 538.
S2a ( 1987) Man. Q.B., not yet reported.
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In this context the replies of the Deputy Minister of Justice Mr.
Tass6 before the Joint Committee on the Constitution are important.
On being questioned about section 6(x) and deportation and exile
of Canadian citizens before the Joint Committee on the Constitution
of Canada, he stated:
Mr. Tass9: Perhaps I might mention that we do not see Clause 6 as
being an absolute right. I will give you an example of a situation where
a citizen would, in effect, lose his right to remain in the country; that
would be by virtue of an order under the Extradition Act; if someone
committed an offence in another country and he is sought in this country, he could be surrendered to the other country.
The same thing would apply in the case of countries belonging to the
Commonwealth to which the Extradition Act does not apply, but the
Fugitive Offenders Act does apply. In that situation a Canadian would
not have the right to remain in the country by virtue of the offences he
might have committed in another country and for which he is sought so
that justice could be applied.
Mr. Epp: Mr. Tass6, I do not think that is really what we are dealing
with. That is not arbitrary and under the Extradition Act there is a
process to which the person is entitled before that extradition order can
in fact be finalized. 33
The debate centred around expulsion and deportation. The statements made before the Joint Committee provide the historical background to the drafting of section 6 ( i ). It broadens the scope of the
record, a practice that was evident in Re Upper Churchill Water
Rights Reversion Act 4 and noted in Law Society of Upper Canada
v. Skapinker.35
In order to interpret section 6 ( i ) and the rights contained therein
it is permissible to look at international human rights instruments.
In many respects the Charter resembles the language of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which together
with its Optional Protocol Canada acceded to in 197636 and the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.3 ' Canada is obligated under article 2 ( I) of the International
Covenant:
33 See Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, Hansard, January 27, 1981, at 46: 117-18.
34 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, at 317 (per McIntyre, J.). See also Reference re AntiInflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 389 (per Laskin, J.).
85 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at 381-82 (per Estey, J.).
3 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47.
37 213 U.N.T.S. 22 1; reprinted in I. Brownlie, Basic Documents in International
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to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly
the adoption of legislative measures.
Is the Charter a response to this obligation? Charter cases to date
indicate that our courts are willing to look at the Covenant, at the
views of the United Nations Committee on Human Rights under the
Optional Protocol, as well as at the jurisprudence under the European Convention for comparative assistance in interpreting the Charter where similar language exists.
Care must be taken when assessing the impact of these instruments on Canadian law. The European Convention is a treaty that
only applies to states members of the Council of Europe. Therefore,
Canada is neither a party, nor entitled to become one. On the other
hand, Canada has acceded to the Covenant and the Optional Protocol. However, it has never been transformed into domestic Canadian
law by an implementing statute.
In the European Convention the right to be protected from extradition is not provided for. However, the European Court of Human
Rights has held that it may be covered if in particular circumstances
one of the possible consequences of extradition to an applicant
involves a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides
that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment," for which the extraditing country could be held
responsible." Article 5 ( i ) (f) of the Convention stipulates that a person may be deprived of his liberty with a view to extradition in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law. One commentator on
the Convention has stated:
Article 5 (I) (f) clearly permits the Commission to decide on the lawfulness (lawful detention/d~tention rjguli~re) of a person against whom
extradition is being taken.... The wording of both the French and
English texts makes it clear that only the existence of extradition proceedings justifies deprivation of liberty in such a case.3 9
Further, Article 3 of Protocol 4 of the European Convention reads:
Law 194 (1967). See also M. Cohen and A. Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law" (1983), 61 Can. Bar
Rev. 265; J. Claydon, "The Application of International Human Rights Law
by Canadian Courts," (1981) 30 Buffalo L. Rev. 727.
38 Appl. No. 6242/73 (Briikmann v. F.R.G.) C.D. 46, at 202, 210.
39 Z. M. Nedjati, Human Rights under the European Convention 9! (1978).

The Extradition of CanadianCitizens
(i) No one shall be expelled, by means of an individual or collective
measure, from the territory of the state of which he is a national.
(2) No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the
40
state of which he is a national.
The European Commission has held that extradition proceedings
are not prohibited under Article 3 (I) of Protocol 4.41 In Briickmann
v. Federal Republic of Germany the European Commission stated:
"'Expulsion' is the execution of an order to leave the country, while
extradition means the transfer of a person from one jurisdiction to
another for the purpose of his standing trial or for the execution of a
sentence imposed upon him ... ""
On this basis it is clear that the European Commission saw an
essential difference between "expulsion" and "extradition. '4' This
interpretation of Article 3 ( I) of Protocol 4 is substantiated by the
preparatory work leading up to the adoption of the Protocol by the
Council of Europe. The ExplanatoryReport on Protocol 4, prepared
by the Committee of Experts on Human Rights, states expressly that
it was understood that extradition was outside the ambit of Article
3(I ) _4
It should be recalled that the drafters of Article 3 specifically used
the term "expelled" rather than "exiled" on account of the fact that
"exiled" raises a variety of possible interpretations. 5 As two commentators have, in our view, aptly stated:
According to a definition given by the Commission, expulsion is involved when "a person is obliged permanently to leave the territory of
the State, without being left the possibility of returning later." The
words "permanently" and "without being left the possibility of returning later" in this definition evidently serve to support the decision of the
Commission that extradition does not fall under the concept of expulsion, and consequently not under the prohibition of Article 3 either.46
In this context it is our view that Article 3 is not "clear and unam40
41

Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 37, at 215.
App. No. 6189/73, C.D. 46, at 214.

4' Supra note 38.
43 Nedjati, op. cit. supra note 39, at 136-37.
44 See Doc. H (7') i i of the Council of Europe, and Nedjati, ibid., at 152.
4 P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European
Convention on Human Rights 368 (1984).
46 Ibid.
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biguous" in prohibiting extradition 7 and that the travaux preparatoires are extremely relevant to this end."8
The United Kingdom is one of the states parties to this Convention, but it should be noted that in the third edition of Halsbury's
Laws of England the British position is summarized as follows:
"Unless the relevant treaty or Order in Council contains express
provisions to the contrary, a fugitive criminal's amenability to extradition is not affected by his nationality; in particular British subjects
are in no better position than aliens... .""
A further indication of this stance is contained in the 1985 Green
Paper presented to the British Parliament by the Secretary of State
for the Home Department.5" The question under discussion in this
paper was whether the United Kingdom should discard the requirement for the establishment of the prima facie case against the fugitive by the requesting state, to bring British extradition law into line
with the civilian European states. Many extradition requests made
to the United Kingdom fail because of the inability to satisfy the
prima facie case requirement. Paragraph 2.4 of the Green Paper is
relevant to the question that we are considering:
The case for maintaining the prima facie requirement derives some support from the fact that the United Kingdom is, in contrast to some
foreign countries prepared to surrender its own nationals. This means
that British nationals can be extradited to countries where they face
criminal proceedings under a legal system which is different from that
which prevails in this country. Anyone who has to face legal proceedings in a foreign country is likely to experience greater hardship than if
he faced trial in his own country. There may be difficulties in securing
legal advice or, if imprisoned, in communicating with other people
(whether inmates or prison officers) or in receiving family visits. In
such circumstances, it may be argued, an examination of the evidence
in a manner similar to that in English domestic committal proceedings
provides an important safeguard....
2.1o
The arguments on this issue concern essentially the extent to
which the prima facie rule in practice acts as a safeguard against individual injustice and the need to balance this principle against that of
effective cooperation with other states.... It might be possible to retain
the prima facie case requirement but to combine this with a relaxation
of the rules on the admissibility of evidence ....
47
48

Or it might be possible

See F. Jacobs, The Convention on Human Rights 185 (1975).
van Dijk and van Hoof, op. cit. supra note 45, at 368.

Extraditionand Fugitive Offenders, op. cit. supra note 15, at 84, para. 2!1.
50 Cmnd. 942! (1985).
49
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to retain the prima facie requirement only in cases where the person
whose rendition is sought is a British national, that is a person for whom
we would have a responsibility of consular protection after he had been
sent to the other country. Such a course would represent a departure
from the general principle that all persons accused of crimes should
receive equality of treatment; but it may be thought that we should be
more cautious about sending our own nationals to face trial in a foreign
jurisdiction than with returning foreign nationals for what in most cases
would be a trial in their own country.
It should be stressed that the prima facie case requirement is part of
Canadian extradition law.51
The provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
and its fourth Protocol have not therefore restricted the British from
extraditing their own nationals. The United Kingdom has not
become a party to the European Convention on Extradition 5 because of its prima facie case requirement.
A further indication of the United Kingdom's position is based on
the interpretation by the English courts of Article 48 of the Treaty of
Rome, 1957, setting up the European Economic Community. Article
48 (3) reads as follows:
[Freedom of movement of workers] shall entail the right, subject to
limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health...
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been
employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
In R. v. Governor of Holloway Prison, ex parte Kember," one of the
submissions by the fugitive was that the order for committal to await
extradition was on account of her being a national of the United
Kingdom contrary to her right to freedom of movement guaranteed
by Article 48. The submission was rejected by the Divisional Court.
Griffith, J. said:
If this submission is right, it will impose a formidable fetter upon extradition.... The whole basis of extradition is that the accused has
offended against society in another country; in all probability he is no
threat to our society. Does that mean that he is not to be extradited to
face justice where he has committed the crime? I cannot believe that
it was the intention of those who drew the Treaty of Rome that it
51
52

See Williams and Castel, op. cit. supra note 3, at 343-44.
1957, ETS 24.

53 [i98o] i W.L.R.

110, [1980 2 C.M.L.R.

125.
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should have the effect of so emasculating the process of extradition....
In R. v. Saunders [[i979] 3 W.L.R. 359] the European Court of Justice
held that Article 48 did not aim to restrict the power of member-states
to lay down restrictions, within their own territory, on the freedom of
movement of all persons subject to their jurisdiction in the implementation of domestic criminal law. I regard extradition as far more closely
analogous to the implementation of domestic criminal law than to
deportation. It is in no true sense a banishment from our shores as is
deportation.... Extradition is no more than a step that assists in the
implementation of the domestic criminal law of the foreign State.5"
5
In Re Habeas Corpus Application of Carthage Healy"
the Divisional Court likewise (albeit dealing with an Irish national) held that
extradition does not infringe the freedom of movement, which includes the "right to remain" under Article 48.
The European Convention on Human Rights and Protocol 4, as
well as Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, can in our estimation be of
assistance in this regard in Canada. The thrust of the travaux preparatoiresof the Charter indicate that section 6 ( i ) was intended to
equate the right to remain in Canada with the right to be free from
expulsion. The principles discussed pertaining to Protocol 4, Article
3(i), and Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome clearly indicate that
"expulsion" and "extradition" are two different things.
By way of contrast, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966 does not refer to the right to "remain" in
the state of one's nationality, or to the right of a national not to be
"expelled." It provides in Article 9(I) for the right of everyone to
liberty and security of the person and non-deprivation of liberty
"except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are established by law." Article 1 2 states that:

(i) Everyone lawfully in the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those that are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present covenant.
54 Ibid., at 1127 (W.L.R.),

'[984] 3 C.M.L.R. 5 75.

142 (C.M.L.R.).
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(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.
Article 13 deals solely with the right of an alien lawfully on the territory not to be expelled, "except in pursuance of a decision reached
in accordance with law ..... " This implies that a national cannot be
made subject to an expulsion order.
In summation, Article 3 of Protocol 4, Article 48 of the Treaty of
Rome, and Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights illustrate that those instruments intend to ensure a
citizen's right to enter and leave a country and the right not to be
arbitrarily expelled without due process of law.
The Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Constitution indicate that this right to "remain" was put into section 6 ( i ) to prevent
a Canadian government passing legislation that would, to use the
words of the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Chr~tien, "kick out" of
Canada Canadians rather than deport them. According to section
4 (I ) of the Immigration Act, 6 there cannot be deportation of Canadians but only of non-Canadians, permanent residents or otherwise,
who are in Canada. The right of Canadian citizens to remain in
Canada contained in section 4(2) of the Act has never been an
obstacle to extradition. In the debate on the Charter, the Minister of
Justice argued that a Canadian government could before the Charter
have sent a Canadian abroad forcefully, making him or her an exile.
The section 6(i) right to remain in Canada would now prevent
that. It would not cover the situation, however, where a Canadian
who obtained citizenship by fraud or other wrongful means is denationalized under section 9 of the Citizenship Act,57 and then
deported as an alien under section 4 (i) of the Immigration Act."8 A
Canadian in legitimate possession of citizenship would by virtue
of section 6 ( i ) be able to oppose an arbitrary deprivation of citizenship and deportation.
On the basis of this analysis it is submitted that section 6 ( i ) of the
Charter does not apply to extradition whether or not the fugitive
can be prosecuted in Canada and that there is no right to resist
extradition carried out in accordance with Canadian extradition law
and treaties.
56 S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.

" S.C. 1974-75-76, c. io8.

.58 See Cooperative Committee on Japanese Canadiansv.
Canada, [1947] A.C. 87, at 104-5 (P.C.).
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SECTION I OF THE CHARTER

Should Canadian courts decide that section 6 ( I ) of the Charter
contains a constitutionally protected right not to be extradited for
Canadian citizens charged with offences for which they may be
prosecuted in Canada, on the same facts, it would still be necessary
to decide whether extradition in such a case, by virtue of section i
of the Charter, constitutes a "reasonable limit prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" on
their right to remain in Canada.
Section x recognizes that none of the rights and freedoms are
absolute. As the Ontario High Court held in Re Lavigne and
O.P.S.E.U.: "It is inevitable that in the application of the Charter,
courts will be faced with clashes between the rights of individuals as
well as conflicts between individual interests and those of the community."59 To answer this question affirmatively it is necessary to
consider the two-part test enunciated by Chief Justice Dickson speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v.
Oakes."°
OBJECTIVE TEST

The first part is that the objective which the measures responsible
for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve must
be "of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally
protected right or freedom."'" Is the objective served by the extradition of a Canadian citizen of sufficient importance to override his
or her right to remain in Canada?
In a series of cases, Canadian courts have recognized that the
objective served by extradition is of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right. Thus, in Re Federal
Republic of Germany and Rauca, " the Ontario Court of Appeal
considered extradition in general" and Canada's Extradition Act 4
•19 (1986),

5 5 O.L.R. (2d) 449, at51x.
60 Supra note 27, at 345 et seq. (C.C.C.).

61 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985),

18 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at 430; 18 D.L.R.

(4th) 321, at 366; [1985] i S.C.R. 295, at 352.
62

Supra note 18.

63 (1983),

4 C.C.C. (3d), at 397-98, expressly approving Evans, C.J. in the
High Court, supra note i8, at 708-9 (O.R.).

64 R.S.C. 1970, c. E-2i.
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and expressed the view that in some circumstances extradition is
necessary to preserve certain fundamental social values and objecfives, in this case to ensure that a crime that could not be punished
in Canada under the rules of territorial jurisdiction did not go unpunished and to respect Canada's international commitments under
her Extradition Treaty with Germany.
5
In Cotroni v. Gardien du Centre de Prevention de Montrial,"
the Quebec Court of Appeal recognized that the suppression of international crime, especially illicit traffic in drugs, is a significant objective of sufficient importance to legitimate the Extradition Act.
Canada has undertaken obligations under bilateral and multilateral
conventions, such as the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of
i96i,6 to fight illicit traffic in drugs and to co-operate with foreign
states in suppressing it. The Court, referring to the maintenance of
peace and order as well as the definition and punishment of criminal
conduct as among the essential objectives of a state's activity in the
criminal field, said: "The carrying out of this function may interfere with the freedom of citizens in certain cases. The suppression of
international crime comes within this objective. It is designed to
ensure that Canada's international commitments are respected. From
both these points of view, the legislative action found in the Extradition Act is in principle legitimate, as has been established by El Zein
and Rauca."' 7
The Court also stated unequivocally that "The extradition treaty
is a means of achieving an objective considered to be socially valid
by both contracting parties" and, one should add, by most civilized
states. 8 In El Zein v. Gardien du Centre de Privention de Montrial,9 one of its earlier decisions, the Quebec Court of Appeal had
already recognized the validity of the objectives of extradition
treaties."'
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in Re Decter and United
States of America71 approved the view expressed by Chief Justice
Evans of the Supreme Court of Ontario in the Rauca case that he
68 [1986] R.J.Q. 2316.
66 1964 Can. T.S. No. 30, in force December 13, 1964.
67 Supra note 65, at 2332.

68 Ibid., 2333.
89 [1986] R.J.Q. 1740.
70

Ibid., 1744.

71

(1983), 148 D.L.R. (3d) 496, aff'd at 512, at 508-9.
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was "satisfied that such statutory restriction which has as its objective, the protection and preservation of society from serious criminal
activity, is one which members of a free and democratic society such
as Canada would accept and enhance." 7 2 Rauca was also approved
by the Court of Appeal of British Columbia in Re Voss and the
Queen."3
Thus, there seems to be a consensus that the objectives extradition
is designed to serve, that is, the suppression of international crime
and the respect for Canada's international commitments, are of sufficient importance to warrant overriding the right of a Canadian citizen to remain in Canada.
In Regina v. Oakes,"4 Chief Justice Dickson when determining
whether the reverse onus provision found in section 8 of the Narcotic
Control Act75 was a reasonable limit on the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, examined
the nature of Parliament's interest or objective for adopting section 8
of the Narcotic Control Act. His finding seems equally applicable to
the Extradition Act. 8
In our view the objective behind extradition from Canada is one
"that relate[s] to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a
free and democratic society ... [and] can be characterized as sufficiently important.""7 The Quebec Court of Appeal in El Zein 8 also
supported the view that "The prevention of crime and in particular
transnational or transborder crime, is therefore a sufficiently important objective to justify legislative action." It is not a matter that is
affected by the possibility of prosecution in Canada. The real issue
is whether the second part of Chief Justice Dickson's test in Oakes
is satisfied, that is, the test of proportionality.
72

Supra note x8, 70 C.C.C. (2d), at

73

(1984),

74

Supra note 27.

12 C.C.C.

429.

( 3 d) 538.

7r- R.S.C. 1970, c. N-i.
76

77
78

At 349-50, esp. at 350: "The objective of protecting our society from the
grave ills associated with drug trafficking is, in my view, one of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom
in certain cases. Moreover, the degree of seriousness of drug trafficking makes
its acknowledgement as a sufficiently important objective for the purposes of
s. i, to a large extent, self-evident. The first criterion of a s. i inquiry, therefore, has been satisfied by the Crown."
Regina v. Oakes, supra note 27, S.C.R. at 138-39.
Supra note 69, at s 745. See also Cotroni,supra note 65, at 2332.
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PROPORTIONALITY TEST

The second part of the test in Oakes is that "the challenged
governmental action must be subjected to a three-pronged 'proportionality test' which seeks to balance the interests of society
against those of the individual." 7 The three parts of the test to be
addressed individually in this section can be summarized as follows:
i. Is there a rational connection between the governmental objective sought to be achieved and the governmental action that is
being challenged?
2. Does the means chosen by the government impair the rights
and freedoms of the applicant as little as possible?
3. The Court must consider and balance the proportionality between the effects of the measures responsible for limiting the right
or freedom in the Charter and the objective which has been identified as of sufficient importance that it may justify the abridgment
of an individual's rights."0
The burden of proof is on the Crown to satisfy the Court in this
regard on a balance of probabilities. This involves a proportionality
test that will vary depending on the circumstances. The interests of
society must be balanced with those of the fugitive. We shall consider the three parts of the test in order.
Is there a rational connection between the government objective
sought to be achieved and the government action that is being
challenged?
The measure adopted, the extradition, must be carefully designed
to achieve the objective in question. It must not be arbitrary, unfair,
or based on irrational considerations. It is clear that extradition is
one of the means necessary to suppress international crime. Extradition is not arbitrary or unfair since both the Extradition Act and the
treaties on extradition to which Canada is a party contain a series
of safeguards for the protection of fugitive criminals.
We disagree with the Quebec Court of Appeal in El Zein,8 '
where it was stated that the extradition in that case had no "rational
connection with the purpose of the legislation, namely the prevention
79 Re Lavigne and O.P.S.E.U., supra note 59, at 513.
80 Ibid., 513-15.
81 Supra note 69.
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of transborder crime." Whether or not there is a basis for prosecution
in Canada, this does not make irrational the connection between the
governmental objective and the action being challenged. The Extradition Act and agreements that Canada has entered into are based
on the reciprocal will to fight crime and prevent fugitive criminals
from escaping by crossing borders. If it is viewed as a matter of policy
that in a given instance it is better to extradite than to prosecute this
cannot alter the rational connection. This view was adopted by the
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench in Swystun 1"
The travaux prdparatoiresto the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the purposes behind the extradition process
make extradition of citizens a reasonable limitation on the right to
remain in Canada.
Regard must also be had to the rationale and purposes of both the
Extradition Act and the relevant Extradition Treaty, as well as the
Fugitive Offenders Act. 2 In the context of serious international
criminal offences, such as trafficking in narcotics, Canada has obligations by way of multilateral treaty commitments to other members of
the international community who are parties. Emphasis must also
be placed on the long history of such legislation and treaty arrangements in free and democratic societies.
In Rauca,8" the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the extradition order made and its consequences, prima facie, interfered with
the right of the fugitive as a Canadian to remain in Canada.84 However, the court proceeded as follows:
The discretion of the executive has been a recognized and accepted
qualification in extradition treaties for over a century. Free and democratic societies have refused to extradite for "political crimes" as they
determine them. It must be noted that here the discretion is entirely in
favour of the "fugitive." The Minister can accept the extradition order
made by the court, or he can refuse to follow it where the treaty provides for the discretionary surrender of nationals; the discretion is exercisable by the executive only and is not a question cognizable by the
courts: Re Galwey, [1896] 1 Q.B. 23o at p. 236; R. v. MacDonald,Ex
p. Strutt ( i 9o i),i x Q.L.J. 85 at p. 9o.
81a Supra note 32a.
82

R.S.C. 1970, c. F-32.

83 Supra note 18, 70 C.C.C. (2d),

at 429 (H.C.); 4 C.C.C. (3d), at 400

(C.A.).
84 See argument presented in the section on Extradition, as to what "remain in"

means and that there is no prima facie interference.
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In reviewing international agreements and their history, it can be
seen that there is no international convention, written or otherwise,
8
that militates against the extradition of a State's own nationals. ,
The Court of Appeal on this question, of course, was dealing with a
case where prosecution was not possible in Canada. Yet, in response
to the suggestion by the fugitive that if prosecution was an alternative, extradition was not a reasonable limit on his right as a citizen
to remain in Canada, the Court stated: "Even if there were such a
right to prosecute, in light of the described purpose and reason for
and lengthy history of extradition, it would not turn a reasonable
limit on the citizen's right to remain in this country into an unreasonable limit." 8
There is no uniform practice in the world concerning nonextradition of nationals. In Rauca the Ontario Court of Appeal also
stated"7 that there is no international convention or rule of customary
international law militating against the extradition of nationals. The
majority of states of the common law tradition, including those of
the Commonwealth and the United States, allow the extradition of
their nationals. It has for centuries been the accepted practice, based
on the belief that if "justice as administered in other States is not to
be trusted, then there should be no extradition at all."8 8 As the Court
of Appeal stressed, the Charter of Rights "has been placed in a fabric
of existing laws to which consideration has to be given."8 9 It went
on to say : "the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum and the rights
set out therein must be interpreted rationally having regard to the
then existing laws and, in the instant case, to the position which
Canada occupies in the world and the effective history of the multitude of extradition treaties that it has had with other nations." 90
Thus, it is submitted that, in El Zein the Quebec Court of Appeal
erred when it said:
Both the Extradition Act and international conventions or treaties
which Canada may have signed before the Charter came into effect
are thus at least in part rendered of no force or effect (s. 52(I) of the
85 Supra note 18, at 655 (D.L.R.).
86 Ibid., 659.

Ibid., 655. The European Convention on Extradition merely permits a state
to refuse to extradite its nationals.
88 See Comment on Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition, (1935) 29 Am.
J. Int'l L. Supp. 128.
89 Supra note 18, at 657 (D.L.R.).
87

90

Ibid., 658.
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ConstitutionAct, 1982), because they are inconsistent with the right of
a Canadiancitizen to remain in Canada (s. 6 ( i ) of the Charter), since
the acts constituting the crime with which he was charged were committed in Canada and constitute a crime in both Canada and in the
requesting StateY1

The conclusion does not follow from the premises.
It is our view that section 6 ( i ) must not be construed narrowly.
Extradition should not be a reasonable limitation only if there is no
right under the Canadian Criminal Code or other Act of Parliament
to prosecute in Canada. There are only a few situations where concurrent jurisdiction with a requesting state under an extradition
treaty could arise: where the substantive offence occurred partly in
Canada and partly in the foreign state; where the offence occurred in
Canada but detrimental effects were felt in the foreign state or vice
versa; where (for a few crimes such as treason, hijacking, acts against
internationally protected persons, hostage-takings, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity) a Canadian commits the crime in the
foreign state in toto; where (for a few crimes such as hijacking, acts
against internationally protected persons, hostage-takings, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity) the victims are Canadians; where (for
a few crimes such as hijacking, acts against internationally protected
persons, hostage-takings, war crimes, and crimes against humanity)
the offender is found in Canada and this is Canada's sole connection
with the offence; and in a case of conspiracy in Canada to violate
foreign law or vice versa.
In the absence of a power to prosecute in Canada and if section
6(1) were to be interpreted as in Rauca and were unfettered by
section i, the right to remain in Canada would be absolute. Extradition of a fugitive regardless of the individual's nationality is either
a reasonable or an unreasonable limitation on the individual's right
to remain in Canada. The nationality of the fugitive is irrelevant as
long as the procedural safeguards for the protection of the fugitive's
interests contained in the Extradition Act and the relevant treaty
are met.
Extradition of citizens of the requested state is a common practice
among civilized states, especially democratic common law states, in
order to achieve the objective of fighting international and transnational crimes. It is justified in a free and democratic society even

if the accused could also be prosecuted for the extraditable offence
in Canada. The principle aut dedere aut punire, that is, to extradite
91 Supra note 69, at 1746.
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or to prosecute and punish, does not apply where it is not mentioned
in the relevant treaty on extradition. A fugitive Canadian citizen is
not deprived of his or her right to stay in Canada since once convicted and having served the sentence or been acquitted in the
requesting state, he or she can return to Canada. Extradition from
Canada is not tantamount to being exiled to the requesting state or
to being denationalized. Even in the case of conviction he or she
may serve the sentence in Canada if there exists a treaty on the transfer of offenders with the foreign state. 2 The Canadian Constitution
does not prohibit the extradition of Canadian citizens. As already
noted, section 6(i) of the Charter has nothing to do with the extradition of Canadian citizens. It is concerned with a political matter,
i.e., to prevent the deportation or exile of Canadian citizens with
whom the government of the day disagrees.9 "
It is worth repeating that in the Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, Mr. Tass6 specifically indicated that section 6(i)
does not confer an absolute right and that a person could lose his or
her right to remain in Canada by virtue of an order under the Extradition Act.' Nor does section 6 ( i ) give Canadian citizens the right
to be tried in Canada for offences committed in Canada or abroad.
Again, section 4(2) of the Immigration Act, which states that a
Canadian citizen has the right to remain in Canada," has never been
an obstacle to the extradition of Canadian citizens.
States that do not extradite their nationals specifically provide for
this exception in their treaties of extradition. They also use the nationality principle as the basis of jurisdiction to prescribe to the full
extent, which is not the case in Canada. For instance, subsections
(3) and (4) of section 423 of the Criminal Code dealing with conspiracy do not confer jurisdiction over an alleged offender on the
basis of his or her nationality, but rather on the territorial link between Canada and the offence. Therefore the principle of nationality,
which is used by some states as a bar to extradition, is not applicable
in Canada.
92 See for instance, Treaty between the United States and Canada on the Trans-

fer of Offenders, 1978, C.T.S. No. 12.
93 See, supra oo-oo, and Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Constitution

of Canada, 27-1-1981,

at 46:118-23, esp. i18-19. Note that Art. 3(I)

of

Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights has been held
not to prohibit measures of extradition.
94 Ibid., 46:
c8.

95 S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.
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Does the means chosen by the government impair the rights and
freedoms of the applicant as little as possible?
Extradition must impair as little as possible the right of a Canadian citizen sought to be extradited, to remain in Canada. This
raises the question whether a valid distinction should be made
between the situation where the accused Canadian citizen could be
prosecuted for the offence both in Canada and in the requesting
state and where he or she could be prosecuted only in the requesting
state.
In both cases the right to remain in Canada is impaired. However,
if the extradition of a fugitive is for reasons of policy held by the
Canadian government to be important for the collective good of
Canada, this should override the fugitive's right to remain. The fugitive when prosecuted in the requesting state will have the substantive
and procedural safeguards of a criminal justice system that Canada
recognizes as having an equivalence to its own, since otherwise
Canada would not have entered into an extradition treaty with the
requesting state. Also, the procedural and substantive protection of
the Extradition Act are available to the fugitive. Thus, the objective
is not disproportionately prejudicial to the fugitive in such a case.
Most certainly in El Zein and Cotroni, where the requesting state
was the United States, it is difficult to accept the view that the fugitives' rehabilitation would suffer on account of being imprisoned
abroad. There would be no language problem and the fugitives
could in an appropriate case seek to return to Canada to serve their
sentence under the Transfer of Offenders Treaty with the United
States. " As was recently held in Swystun, the impact on the citizen is
minimal.
The Court must consider and balance the proportionality between
the effects of the measures responsible for limiting the right or freedom in the Charter and the objective, which has been identified as
of sufficient importance that it may justify the abridgment of an
individual'srights.
The effect of extradition is the sending of the fugitive accused
Canadian citizen to the requesting state to stand trial for the crime
for which he or she is charged. This achieves the objectives of prosecuting transnational offences and of fulfilling Canada's international
commitments.
98 Supra note 92.
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According to Dixon, C.J.C., even if an objective is of sufficient
importance and the first two elements of the proportionality test are
satisfied, it is still possible that because of the severity of the deleterious
effects of the measure on the accused, such measure will not be justified by the objective or purpose it is intended to serve. The more
severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the
objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In extradition cases,
the question is whether the extradition would have more deleterious
effects on the fugitive accused by having him or her prosecuted in
the requesting state rather than if he or she were prosecuted in
Canada. That extradition is reasonable is suggested by the practice
of common law states that extradite their nationals. It is justified in
a free and democratic society, as most states resort to extradition to
fight transnational and international crimes. It is justified even
where the accused could also be prosecuted in Canada, since in cases
of concurrent jurisdiction, although both states may prosecute the
accused, it is reasonable for a state to defer to the state that has
primary jurisdiction as the state most detrimentally affected.
To exempt fugitive accused Canadian citizens or fugitive foreign
convicted Canadian citizens from extradition and not landed immigrants or other aliens when both categories of accused can be tried
in Canada would also, in our opinion, create an unfair distinction
between citizens and aliens, thus violating the equality rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 7 since
"every individual is equal before and under the law ... without discrimination ... based on ... national or ethnic origin."
THE

ROLE OF THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND
REVIEW OF MINISTERIAL DISCRETION

It is interesting to note that although the Supreme Court of
Canada has not, as yet, had the opportunity to address directly the
issue of the meaning of the right to remain contained in section 6 ( i )
of the Charter and whether it is necessary to look at section I of the
same, the Court has recently had cause to look at other matters concerning extradition and the Charter. Of relevance to this article is
the analysis of the respective roles of the extradition judge and the
Minister of Justice. If as the Supreme Court suggests the role of the
97

Section 15(1).
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extradition judge "is a modest one" 8 related to ensuring that the
evidence establishes a prima facie case and that an extradition crime
has been committed and that responsibility for the conduct ol
Canada's foreign relations, including obligations assumed under
extradition treaties, lies with the executive, in this case the Minister
of Justice, can it not be argued further that any plea that the right
to remain is interfered with must at any rate await the Minister's
decision. Hanssen J. in the Swystun case has taken this position. The
extradition judge under section 18(I )(b) of the Extradition Act
shall commit the fugitive offender for surrender if such evidence is
produced as would justify a trial in Canada. The judge's role ends
there. It is the Minister who makes the final decision when a committal has been made by the extradition judge. Section 25 of the Act
provides that the Minister may surrender such a person. Since Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queeni9 it would appear possible, based
on section 7 of the Charter of Rights, that the fugitive could at this
juncture seek a review of the Minister's discretion.
COMPARATIVE INTERESTS OF STATES WITH CONCURRENT
JURISDICTON AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

In this era of a rapid growth in international and transnational
crimes it is necessary for states to co-operate through extradition.
However, to ensure that co-operation in cases where, for whatever
reason, extradition proves impossible, there must be a universal
acceptance by states of elastic jurisdictional principles that are
moulded to fit the realities of modern-day crime.1"' The application
of the criminal law should not be focused rigidly on one or other
of the aspects of the territorial principle of jurisdiction over the
offence, or on the nationality of the accused principle. To do so
could result in a jurisdictional void, with the accused slipping
through the loose strands of international co-ordination. It would
be better to have the potential for prosecution lying with more than
one state.
The purpose of this section is to indicate briefly some of the situations that can present us with concurrent jurisdiction, and to assess
how overlapping claims and interests of states may be accommodated
98 In Schmidt v. U.S.A., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 5oo, at 52o. La Forest, J. stated that

section 6 was not raised in the case, "no doubt because her counsel believed, as
I do, that it was properly disposed of in the Rauca case...
99 Supra note 29.
100 See S. A. Williams and J.-G. Castel, op. cit. supra note 3, at vii.
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and what impact prosecutorial discretion in Canada must play in
this respect.
In a relatively few instances, Canada may under Canadian criminal law have concurrent jurisdiction over an offence with a foreign
state or states. This may arise where the offence begins in Canada
but is consummated in another state. In this situation Canada could
invoke the subjective territorial or initiatory theory of jurisdiction
and the foreign state the objective or terminatory theory. In the
reverse situation, Canada could base its claim on the objective theory
and the foreign state on the subjective theory. In both cases Canada
would claim jurisdiction if significant elements of the crime occurred
there, based on the Libman case. °oa In another scenario, Canada or
the foreign state may simply be claiming jurisdiction on the basis
of detrimental effects occurring there. This is called the "effects
felt" or injured forum principle. Other bases that may be relied upon
are the active and passive nationality principles that take into
account the nationality of the perpetrator and accused respectively
and the presence of the alleged offender within the territory of the
prosecuting state, which is akin to the universal principle of jurisdiction and is part of the framework of the various anti-terrorist conventions to which Canada and many other states are party to.
Where a conspiracy occurs in Canada to violate the laws of a
foreign state 1' and the act if done in Canada would be a criminal
offence, and in the reverse situation also, where a conspiracy is
hatched abroad to violate Canadian law,10 2 there would exist concurrent jurisdiction if the foreign state had similar legislative provisions to those contained in the Criminal Code.
Crimes committed on board Canadian ships registered under the
Canadian Shipping Act' when they are in foreign territorial waters,
inland waters or ports and harbours, or those committed on board
foreign ships in similar locations in Canada will also result in potential concurrent jurisdiction, as will crimes committed on board
aircraft.
The classic case of the Lotus 4' is always cited for the proposition
that a state may exercise jurisdiction, as long as it does not violate
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 178.
101 Section 423 (3), Criminal Code.
102 Section 423 (4), Criminal Code.

1o0a

103 R.S.C. 1970, c. S- 9 .
104 (1927),

P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. io.
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international law. Clearly, in using the various applications of the
territorial and nationality principles no such violation would occur.
Likewise, in some instances the universal principle may be validly
applied.
In order to solve the potential for conflicts of jurisdiction by two
or more states claiming the right to prosecute, it has been suggested
that jurisdiction can be claimed only by the state where the primary
effects of the criminal acts are felt: "In order to determine whether
the effects are primary or secondary, two factors should be considered: (i) are the effects felt in one State more direct than the
effects felt in other States? (2) are the effects felt in one State more
substantial than the effects felt in other States?"1 5 This suggestion,
if adopted, would justify jurisdiction being exercised only by states
that have a superior legitimate interest in applying their criminal laws.
The influence of this reasoning can be seen in Article 4 of Canada's
recent Extradition Treaty of February 1987 with India, which provides that although a request for extradition may be refused by the
requested state if the fugitive may be tried for the same offence in its
own courts, in deciding whether or not to refuse, the requested
state shall consider whether it or the requesting state has felt or will
feel more gravely or imminently the effects or consequences of the
offence. Section 12 of the Canadian Extradition Act also specifically
allows the extradition of a fugitive criminal "whether there is or is
not any criminal jurisdiction in any court ... [of Canada] over the
fugitive in respect of the crime."
It is useful to consider that section 403 of The Restatement of the
Law, Foreign Relations Laws of the United States, Third.. subjects
the exercise of jurisdiction to the principles of reasonableness and
fairness in accommodating the overlapping interests of the states and
individuals involved:
403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe

(i) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under s. 402 is present,
a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
105 M.

Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International Law,"

(1973)

46 Brit. Y.B.

Int'l L. 146, at 198.
10 (1987). See also U.S.A. v. Allard and Charette, [19871 1 S.C.R. 564, at 572,
where the Supreme Court of Canada held at p. 7 that: "to arrive at the conclusion that the surrender of the respondents would violate the principles of
fundamental justice, it would be necessary to establish that the respondents
would face a situation that is simply unacceptable." See also Argentina v.
Mellino, [19871 1 S.C.R. 536, at 555.
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person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2)
Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including,
where appropriate,
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory,
or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory:
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state
and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance
of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
1(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the
two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own
as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all
the relevant factors in Subsection (2) ; a state should defer to the other
state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
In a study. 7 of existing extradition practices with specific reference
to drug-related offences, the United Nations Division of Narcotic
Drugs stated that the principles of jurisdiction contained in the
Restatement are limited by the notion of "reasonableness" and that
jurisdiction will be unreasonable "if its assertion is exorbitant, for
example if another state has a significant interest in asserting jurisdiction. The role of reasonableness thus appears to be an attempt to
determine the proper forum."
107
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It is our contention that whether Canada can prosecute under the
jurisdictional principles of (i) territorial connection (either subjective, objective, effects felt or substantial connection, as per R. v.
Libman)' or (2) nationality of the offender being Canadian, this
does not obviate the responsibility that Canada has to the requesting
state under a valid bilateral extradition treaty. It is not in issue that
Canada must have a sound basis of jurisdiction for this question of
non-extradition to arise, otherwise the dictum in Rauca would
govern. Therefore the question squarely put is as follows: in a case
of concurrent jurisdiction with a sound basis for initiating proceedings in Canada and in the requesting state, may prosecutorial discretion be exercised in Canada so as to proceed with extradition
rather than prosecution in Canada or does section 6 (i) give the
accused Canadian citizen a right to be prosecuted in Canada?
Historically, in the field of criminal law the exercise of prosecutorial powers has been unfettered.' 0 Prosecutorial discretion has
been viewed as both necessary and desirable.11 There has been
judicial reluctance to enter into a review of these powers."' The
powers are derived from either the common law grant of prerogative power to the Attorney General and his agents or by way of
statute.
It has been suggested that the reasons for judicial restraint are
based on historical, constitutional, and practical grounds." 2 Apart
from the historical grounds, some decisions have posited the view
that the courts are not a suitable forum for deciding or interfering
with matters containing high policy considerations."' Madame Justice Wilson stated in Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen".
that the question of judicial capacity has often been raised by the
10s [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178.
109 D. C. Morgan, "Controlling Prosecutional Powers,"

(1986)

29 Crim. L.Q.

15, at 16. See the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 15,

Criminal Procedure:Control of the Process (1975).
11o Ibid.
"I Ibid., 20.
112 Ibid., 22.
113 Ibid., 30-31.

See P. Cane, "'Prerogative Acts, Acts of State and Justiciability," ( 198o) 29 Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 68o, at 681. See Swystun v. U.S.A.,
(x987) Man. Q.B., not yet reported, where Hanssen J. states at p. 13 that
"... if the courts were to adopt the approach taken in El Zein and Cotroni,
they would be usurping a function delegated to the Minister of Justice by
Parliament."

114 Supra note 29, at 50o.
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courts. She would appear to take the view that the non-involvement
of the courts should be grounded on unsuitability or non-justiciability.
In our view, Madame Justice Wilson was correct in her categorization of the issue as not being the "ability" of the courts to decide the
issues presented but the "appropriateness of doing so."'' On a practical note the floodgates argument has been raised. As the Law
Reform Commission of Canada noted in 1975: "To subject each
decision of the Crown to judicial scrutiny would place an intolerable
burden on the judiciary, and present the theoretical, if not real,
possibility of endless litigation. '
However, the bottom line appears to be that the criminal justice
system best operates through a broad grant of prosecutorial discretion. " 7 As Chief Justice Fauteux delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Smythe noted:
Enforcement of the law and especially of the criminal law would be
impossible unless someone in authority be vested with some measure of
discretionary power. The following statements made in the Lafleur case
...are to the point and I adopt them.
I cannot conceive of a system of enforcing the law where someone in
authority is not called upon to decide whether or not a person should
be prosecuted for an alleged offence. Inevitably there will be cases
where one man is prosecuted while another man, perhaps equally guilty,
goes free. A single act, or series of acts, may render a person liable to
prosecution on more than one charge, and someone must decide what
charges are to be laid. If an authority such as the Attorney General can
have the right to decide whether or not a person shall be prosecuted,
surely he may, if authorized by statute, have the right to decide what
form the prosecution shall take.'"
There may be valid reasons why the Attorney General decides
not to prosecute. These should not be interfered with by the courts.
To do so would in effect be saying "you must prosecute here." This
would overstep the bounds of the division of powers." 9 As the Law
Reform Commission of Canada stated in 1975:
An analysis of the discretionary powers presently possessed by the Crown
reveals that many of these powers have important political aspects in
11, Ibid.
log, at 2 1.
Ibid., 31. See, e.g., R. v. Smythe (1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 98; 13 C.R.N.S. 7
(Ont. H.C.), aff'd 3 C.C.C. (2d) 97 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd 3 C.C.C. (2d) 366
(s.c.c.).
118 Ibid., 370.
119 Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 1o9, at 22.

116 Op. cit. supra note
117
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the sense described above. By way of illustration, charging decisions,
including the decision whether to enforce a particular prohibition, who
to charge, what to charge and whether to continue a prosecution, are
pre-eminently political.... In other cases, invoking the machinery of
criminal justice involves balancing factors peculiar to that case, such as
the hardship to the accused compared to the benefit to society derived
from a prosecution, or the necessity to sacrifice one potentially successful prosecution to increase chances of success in another more important case, or the need to satisfy the demands of a public sympathetic to
the cause of the accused. The vigour with which laws are enforced is,
or should be, a reflection of the relative importance of the laws in preserving public order and the moral imperative of the legal system. In
all cases, the decision to prosecute or not is one affecting the allocation
of resources.
Decisions relating to these matters with important political overtones
should generally be within the discretionary powers of the Attorney
General and his agents. The exercise of this discretion should not be
subject to judicial control. Various techniques could be invoked to
bring such matters under judicial control, but none, in our view, would
be desirable or feasible. As stated above, it is essential to the proper
administration of justice to confer on some authority some degree of
discretion to decide matters, such as, whether or not to prosecute. The
infinite number of variables that affect such decisions would defeat any
attempt to eliminate discretion by creating a code of detailed legal rules
to govern the decision-making authority. Even if possible, formal legal
rules as a substitute for discretion would eliminate from the system the
flexibility that is essential in order to permit dispositions appropriate to
the particular circumstances of the offence, the offender, the locality
and the times.
If it is impossible to eliminate prosecutorial discretion in relation to
matters that we have characterized as political, it would likewise be
undesirable and impractical to subject the exercise of this discretion to
judicial review, and thus, in a sense, substitute judicial discretion for
prosecutorial discretion. This would impose upon the judiciary an
onerous task that could only be performed if the size of the judiciary
were significantly increased and if the system were radically changed to
put them in possession of information necessary for such decisions. As
explained above, such a system would jeopardize their impartiality in
the adversary process, and involve them in matters both political and
controversial that would imperil their independence and reputation.
Though the political accountability of the Attorney General and the
other restraints on Crown power are far from being a perfect guarantee
against mistakes, they are, we believe, preferable to the unnecessary
politicization of the judiciary.
If politics is the realm of the Crown, adjudication is the realm of the
judiciary. We recognize that political and justiciable issues are not
mutually exclusive. To a certain extent there will always be an overlapping of the two. The judiciary cannot, and should not, be insensitive
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to policy or political considerations. We are not suggesting a system of
mechanical jurisprudence that would require the judiciary to ignore
such matters. What we do propose is one that will exclude from the
adjudicative function those political issues that can best be resolved by
the Crown. In excluding such matters we seek, not to belittle the judicial process, but rather to strengthen it by preserving judicial impartiality and independence. 2
Before the Charter of Rights there is no evidence of any case law
whereby our courts enquired into and reviewed the reasons behind
not laying charges in Canada. The decision to engage in extradition
proceedings rather than to prosecute in Canada may be taken for
( i ) practical reasons such as location of evidence, witnesses, expense
of transporting such to Canada; (2) consideration that on balance
even though Canada has sufficient jurisdictional bases for prosecution of the offence the requesting state has been affected to a greater
extent; (3) other co-accused may have prosecutions pending or have
been convicted in the requesting state; and (4) foreign policy reasons. It would in our view be unwise and unprecedented for the
courts to review prosecutorial reasons.
The interests of Canadian society as a whole in seeing that fugitive
offenders are brought to justice in the most effective locale and that
the Canadian criminal justice system is not impaired must be attended by weighty consideration. It is worth noting the remarks by
Madame Justice Wilson in OperationDismantle Inc. v. The Queen
albeit that they concern section 7 of the Charter, where she stated:
Even an independent substantive right to life, liberty and security of the
person cannot be absolute.... The concept of "right" as used in the
Charter postulates the interrelation of individuals in society, all of
whom have the same right .... 121
The concept of "right" as used in the Charter, must also, I believe,
recognize and take account of the reality of the modem State.
and further that:
there must be a strong presumption that governmental action which
concerns the relations of the state with other states, and which is therefore not directed at any member of the immediate political community,
was never intended to be caught by section 7, even though such action
may have the incidental effect of increasing
the risk of death or injury
22
that individuals generally have to face.1
12o

Ibid., 31, 33-35 (emphasis added).
at 516-17 (D.L.R.). See also J. Rawls, A Theory of justice

121 Supra note 29,
213 (1971).
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Ibid., 518.
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One commentator has suggested 2 ' that while the above statement
can be distinguished from the situation where the right of the individual is directly affected "the conservatism evident here is likely to
surface in other contexts." It is our opinion that it would be inherently justifiable in the case of section 6 ( i ) of the Charter of Rights.
INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATIES ON EXTRADITION

Canada is bound by a number of extradition treaties and under
the Fugitive Offenders Act to extradite her nationals in the absence
of any specific prohibition. By refusing to do so, Canada would
violate such treaties and international law in not fulfilling her international commitments, 2 " one of the objectives of extradition. Thus,
the treaties, the Extradition Act, and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms must be interpreted so as not to violate Canada's international obligations.
By far the greatest number of extradition requests to and from
Canada involve the United States of America. It is therefore instructive to consider the Treaty on Extradition between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the United States of America
signed in Washington on December 3, 1971 as amended by an
Exchange of Notes and entered into force for Canada on March 22,
1976."' It provides in Article I that:
Each Contracting Party agrees to extradite to the other, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions described in this Treaty, persons
found in its territory who have been charged with, or convicted of, any
of the offenses covered by Article 2 of this Treaty committed within the
territory of the other, or outside thereof under the conditions specified
in Article 3 (3) of this Treaty.

Article

2 (2 )

states that:

(2) Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit, or conspiracy to commit or being a party to any of the offenses listed in the
annexed Schedule.

Furthermore, Article 3 (3) contains the following provision:
(3) When the offense for which extradition has been requested has
been committed outside the territory of the requesting State, the execu-

tive or other appropriate authority of the requested State shall have
123
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the power to grant the extradition if the laws of the requested State
provide for jurisdiction
over such an offence committed in similar
128
circumstances.

Part I of the Extradition Act applies to extradition under treaty.
Article 4, which deals with cases where extradition shall not be
granted, does not contain an exception in favour of the citizens of
the contracting states. Therefore, under the treaty it is clear that the
contracting states are obliged to extradite their own citizens whether
or not they can be prosecuted in the requested state. Citizenship does
not play a role in extradition between Canada and the United States
of America. The preamble to the treaty, by declaring that both
countries desire to make more effective their co-operation in the
repression of crime by way of reciprocal extradition of offenders,
does not contain such limitation. To read into the treaty a provision
that citizens of Canada cannot be extradited for offences for which
they can be tried in Canada is contrary to the express terms not only
of the treaty but also the Extradition Act.
It is a well-established principle that: "Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith."1 7 Furthermore: "A party may not invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.... . "2 No question of treaty interpretation arises where the
terms of the relevant treaty of extradition are clear. Thus, a refusal
to extradite a fugitive on the ground of citizenship would constitute
a breach of an international obligation under the treaty. If the terms
of the treaty were unclear, Canadian courts would still have to
construe them and the relevant provisions of the Extradition Act so
as to fulfil Canada's international obligations. 2 '
126
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International law is part of the law of Canada.' Thus, in interpreting the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or a statute, the courts,
following Anglo-American tradition, will presume that the legislature did not intend to derogate from international law. There is a
rule to the effect that legislation is to be construed so as to avoid this
effect whenever possible.1"' "In other words, there is an interpretative presumption, applicable in the context of construing the Charter,
that Parliament and the legislatures intend to fulfill Canada's inter132
national obligations.'
On the other hand, when the intention of the legislature to derogate from international law is clearly to be ascertained from the Act
itself, a municipal court is bound by its own jurisdictional rule to
give effect to the overriding supremacy of the legislative will.' Even
if, contrary to our opinion, section 6(1) of the Charter is taken to
be prima facie in conflict with the Extradition Act, it must be
remembered that it is subject to section i. In the Rauca case it did
not override the Treaty on Extradition with Germany. Therefore, it
is possible to conclude that Canadian courts must attempt to reconcile the Charter with Canada's international obligations and that
the extradition of Canadian citizens is a reasonable limit prescribed
by law within the context of Canada's international obligations, as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society in all
cases, since many free and democratic states extradite their nationals
unconditionally.
Reference re Exemption of U.S. Forces from Canadian Criminal Law, [1943]
S.C.R. 483, at 516; [1943] 4 D.L.R. ii, at 41; Foreign Legations Case,
[s943] S.C.R. 2o8, at 230-31; [1943] 2 D.L.R. 481, at 5o.
131 For instance, in Re The Annapolis, Lush. 295, at 3o6 (i86i) ; Solomon v.
Commrs. of Customs and Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. i16, at 143; [1966] 3 All.
E.R. 871 (C.A.) : "But if the terms of the legislation are not clear but are
reasonably capable of more than one meaning, the treaty itself becomes
relevant, for there is a presumption that Parliament does not intend to act
in breach of international law, including therein specific treaty obligations .... Post Office v. Estuary Radio, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1396; [1968] 2
Q.B. 74 o , at 757; [1967] 3 All E.R. 663 (C.A.); Stag. Line Ltd. v. Foscolo,
Mango & Co., [19321] A.C. 328, at 350 (H.L.); Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) ) 64, at s18 (1804) ; R. v. Keyn [187677] 2 Ex. 63, at 85 (1876) (per Sir R. Phillimore) ; Mortensen v. Peters, 14
Scots L.T.R. 227 (19o6).
132 M. Cohen and A. F. Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law," (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 265, at 281.
See also at 288.
133 E.g., The MariannaFlora, 24 U.S. ( i i Wheat) i (1826) ; Swait v. Board of
Trustees of Maritime Transportation Union (1967), 6i D.L.R. (2d) 317;
[1967] B.R. 315 (Que. C.A.).
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CONCLUSION

It is our opinion based on the above analysis that the right to
remain in Canada is not the right to resist extradition, with its builtin safeguards for the fugitive. Alternatively, should section 6 ( i) be
read to apply to extradition, then extradition, even if prosecution in
Canada is possible on the same facts, is a reasonable limit prescribed
by law, as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.

Sommaire

L'extradition des citoyens canadiens et les articles Iet 6 ( i ) de la
Charte canadienne des Droits et Libertks
Les auteurs soutiennent que l'extradition d'un citoyen canadien qui a
commis un acte criminel pour lequel il pourrait tre poursuivi au Canada ne constitue pas une violation de l'article 6, premier alinea de la
Charte canadienne des Droits et Libertis, qui stipule que tout citoyen
canadien a le droit de demeurer au Canada.Mgme si, i premiere vue,
l'extradition devait violer ce droit, les auteurs estiment qu'en vertu de
l'article i de la Charte, il peut itre restreint par une r~gle de droit dans
des limites raisonnableset dont la justification peut se demontrer dans le
cadre d'une socilti libre et dimocratique.

